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INTRODUCTION

Every loyal citizen of the Tar Heel state is a basketball fan. With
schools like UNC, Duke, Wake Forest, and NC State, it is nearly
impossible to live in North Carolina without gaining a love and
appreciation for the sport. After watching and studying the game, the
rules become obvious, and if you play by the rules and score the most
points, your team wins. But, basketball would be a whole different
game if no one knew the rules. In the game of post-conviction
litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States interprets the
rules, and lower courts and litigants play along hoping for the
ultimate win-a new sentence. After the Supreme Court's decision in
Miller v. Alabama,' though, no one knows the rules of the game. The
Miller Court stated the desired result, yet left the rest to be sorted out
by the lower courts. Specifically, the Miller Court left the issue of the
retroactivity of its holding unresolved, spurring huge amounts of
confusion at the state level. If the lower courts do not come to a
consensus on how to apply Miller, litigants across the country will be
forced to play by different rules, the results of which will inevitably be
unfair because the constitutional rights granted by Miller will not be
afforded to all litigants uniformly.
On June 25, 2012, in a divided 5-4 decision, the United States
Supreme Court held in Miller and its companion case Jackson v.
Hobbs,2 that any mandatorily imposed sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") for juvenile offenders
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.3 In doing so, the Court deemed unconstitutional the
sentencing laws of twenty-six states and the federal government.' As a
result, states must now tailor their criminal sentencing structures to
meet the requirements of Miller, but they are aided by practically no
guidance from the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court was silent
on the issue of whether lower courts should apply its holding
retroactively to juveniles sentenced to LWOP prior to June 25, 2012.
1.
2.
3.
4.

132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Id.
See id. at 2460.
See Brief for Respondent at 17, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9647).
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This Comment focuses on the fate of the nearly 2,500 prisoners
throughout the country who, prior to the Court's decision in Miller,
received LWOP sentences for crimes committed before their
eighteenth birthdays.' This Comment argues that the Court's decision
in Miller must be applied retroactively and that other states should
follow North Carolina's lead in enacting legislation that reflects such
a retroactive application. The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I
provides an overview of the two lines of cases that led up to the
Court's holding in Miller, an overview of Miller, and a description of
the challenge that Miller poses to the states regarding its retroactivity.
Part II articulates the constitutional argument for retroactivity-that
Miller represented a substantive change in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and therefore must be applied to defendants whose
sentences are already final. Part III provides a comparative analysis
of various states' reactions to Miller, and argues that as a policy
matter, the Miller decision must be applied retroactively. Part III also
highlights North Carolina's approach and argues that it is the most
likely to pass constitutional muster in light of Miller's promise to treat
juveniles differently. Finally, Part IV analyzes the practical effects of
retroactivity by focusing on a select number of North Carolina
juveniles sentenced to mandatory LWOP. This analysis shows the
benefits of North Carolina's response to Miller in contrast to other
states' responses. Part IV demonstrates that retroactive resentencing
hearings in accordance with Miller have and will affect juvenile
LWOP sentences in North Carolina in a manner that is consistent
with the spirit of the Eighth Amendment. This analysis will highlight
the potential benefits of North Carolina's response to Miller in
contrast to other states' approaches.
I. MILLER AND ITS ANCESTRY

A.

The Facts of Miller and Jackson

The Supreme Court heard Miller and Jackson together as
companion cases because the two cases raised identical issues. In both
Miller and Jackson, the juvenile defendants were fourteen years old
when they were charged with murder.6 In Jackson's case, he and two
other boys set out to rob a video store in Blytheville, Arkansas.'
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2008, at 3 (2008).
6. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
7. See Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004), habeas corpus denied sub
norn. Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455.
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However, on the way to the store, Jackson discovered that one of the
other boys had a sawed-off shotgun concealed in his coat sleeve.'
Jackson stayed outside while the other two boys went inside.' At
some point, however, Jackson entered the store.10 The facts thereafter
are in dispute, but Jackson either stated "we ain't playin' " to the
store clerk, or "I thought you all was playin' " to his friends.u
Regardless of his exact words, after the clerk refused to hand over the
money and threatened to call the police, one of Jackson's companions
shot and killed her, and the three boys fled the store empty-handed.12
Similarly to Jackson, Miller committed murder in a failed
robbery attempt. 3 Miller was at home in Lawrence County, Alabama,
with a minor friend when Cole Cannon came to his house to make a
drug deal with Miller's mother.14 Cannon then invited the two boys to
come to his trailer, and after the trio spent hours drinking and using
drugs together, Cannon passed out." Miller and his friend stole
Cannon's wallet and split the $300 they stole, but Cannon awoke
unexpectedly when Miller tried to return the wallet to his pocket.16 A
fight ensued, ending with Miller beating Cannon with a baseball bat
until he could not stand up or move." Miller then "placed a sheet
over Cannon's head, told him 'I am God, I've come to take your
life,' " and delivered an additional blow.'" The boys then retreated to
Miller's home." Later, though, they decided to return to Cannon's
trailer and light a fire to cover up the evidence of their crime.20
Cannon died from a combination of his injuries and smoke
inhalation.2 1
Arkansas and Alabama law give prosecutors in both states the
discretion to charge fourteen-year-olds as adults if they commit
certain crimes.2 The prosecutors in both Jackson's and Miller's cases
8. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 2462.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 689 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev'd sub
nom. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 2461-62; ALA. CODE § 12-15-203(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (2009).
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exercised that authority, and eventually, juries convicted both
juveniles of capital murder and the judge sentenced them to LWOP.23
The laws of both Arkansas and Alabama mandated either LWOP or
death upon conviction for capital murder; however, neither Miller nor
Jackson could be sentenced to death after 2005, when the Supreme
Court banned the death penalty for minors under the age of
eighteen. 24 Therefore, the sentencing authorities in Miller's and
Jackson's cases had no discretion to impose a punishment other than
LWOP upon conviction of first-degree murder.25 In both cases, the
state appellate courts upheld the mandatory LWOP sentence,26 and
the United States Supreme Court subsequently combined the cases
and granted certiorari.27
B.

The Eighth Amendment and the Miller Court's PrecedentialWeb

Generally, in determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual, the Supreme Court looks beyond historical conceptions and
allows changing morals of society to affect the standard.28 e

23. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460-62. Jackson was convicted of capital felony murder
under the theory of accomplice liability. Id. at 2477 (Breyer, J., concurring). Under
Arkansas law, "[a] defendant convicted of capital murder ... shall be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment without parole .
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 2011).
Similarly, Miller was convicted of murder in the course of arson and sentenced to
mandatory LWOP in accordance with Alabama law which dictates that "the punishment
for murder ... is death or life imprisonment without parole." ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c);
see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(9) ("The following are
capital offenses: . . . [m]urder by the defendant during arson.").

24. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) ("The age of 18 is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we
conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.").
25. In fact, during Jackson's sentencing hearing the judge pointedly stated, "in view of
[the] verdict, there is only one possible punishment." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461 (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Ark. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Miller, 132 S.
Ct. 2455; Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 682 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Miller,
132 S. Ct. 2455. In Jackson's case, two justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court dissented,
pointing out that it is "of great concern" that "[a]t the time of sentencing, the circuit court
could not consider the defendant's age or any other mitigating circumstances-the circuit
court only had jurisdiction to sentence Jackson to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole." Jackson, 378 S.W.3d at 109 (Danielson, J., dissenting). Miller's life sentence
was unanimously upheld by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which noted that
"[a]lthough 'life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,' such a
sentence is not overly harsh when compared to the crime of which Miller was convicted."
Miller, 63 So. 3d at 690 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010)).
27. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10-9646) (granting
certiorari).
28. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) ("[T]he standard of extreme
cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The
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the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is the concept of
proportionality-the punishment must fit the crime.29 In the context
of criminal sentencing structures for juveniles, the Eighth
Amendment issue is whether juvenile offenders (because of their age)
are sufficiently less culpable than adults, so as to render them
constitutionally barred from receiving the state's harshest sentences.
In deciding whether the punishment in question violates the
Constitution, the Court will consider "objective indicia of society's
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice,"'
yet ultimately, the Court uses its own independent judgment, guided
by controlling precedents, to determine the confines of the Eighth
Amendment.32
In order to supply its precedential basis for holding that
sentencing schemes mandating juvenile LWOP are unconstitutional,
the Miller Court wove together two lines of Eighth Amendment
cases.33 The first line, the Graham/Roperline, demands that children
be viewed as fundamentally different from adults in the context of
criminal culpability.34 The second line, the Woodson line, requires an
individualized assessment of every criminal defendant prior to the
imposition of a mandatory death sentence.35 Taken together, these
two lines of cases form the basis of the Court's conclusion in Miller
that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violate the
Eighth Amendment.36 This conclusion, along with the Court's
discussion of constitutional precedent, has important implications for
the retroactivity debate.

standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of
society change." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010); see also Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense.").
30. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
31. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005).
32. See id. at 575 ("[Tjhe task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the
Supreme Court's] responsibility."); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (discussing the
guiding precedents in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
33. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
34. See id. at 2465 ("Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of
youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on
juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.").
35. See id. at 2467 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
36. See id. at 2468 ("So Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases
alike teach that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he
treats every child as an adult.").
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Graham v. Florida37 and Roper v. Simmons" represent the end of

the Court's long refusal to categorically bar certain punishments for
juvenile offenders. First, the Court held in Roper that it is cruel and
unusual punishment to sentence a defendant to death for a crime
committed before his eighteenth birthday. 39 As in Miller's case, the
juvenile defendant in Roper committed an extremely violent and
undoubtedly horrendous crime.40 However, the Court looked past the
mere facts of the gruesome crime and issued a watershed decision
that, at its core, dictated that age matters in criminal sentencing, and
the age of the defendant alone can preclude certain punishments.4 1
The Roper Court set forth three "general differences" between
juveniles and adults that demonstrate the criminal culpability of a
juvenile cannot be equated with that of an adult.42 First, juveniles
have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility" that often results "in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions." 43 Second, "juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure."" Third, "the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are
more transitory, less fixed."4 5 Taken together, the Roper Court held
that these inherent characteristics of juvenile offenders require
special consideration of a defendant's age during the sentencing
process and even a categorical ban on capital punishment.4 6
Five years later, the Supreme Court extended its decision in
Roper, imposing an additional categorical ban on certain punishments
for juvenile offenders. In Graham, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment disallows the imposition of LWOP for juveniles who

37. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
38. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
39. Id. at 575.
40. Seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons kidnapped a woman with whom he had
previously been in a car wreck, bound her hands and feet, wrapped her whole face in duct
tape and threw her over a bridge to drown. See id. at 556-57. The next day, Simmons
bragged about the killing at school. See id. at 557.
41. See id. at 573-74 ("When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State
can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his
life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.").
42. See id. at 569-70.
43. Id. at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 570.
46. See id. at 572-73 ("The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death
penalty despite insufficient culpability.").
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commit non-homicide offenses.47 The Court asserted that LWOP
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences because
"the sentence alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable" and "deprives the convict of the most basic liberties
without giving hope of restoration."4 8 In doing so, the Graham Court
reasoned that a LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender is
impermissibly disproportionate to his criminal culpability when no
homicide is committed,4 9 given the "differences of youth" highlighted
by Roperso and the severity of a LWOP sentence."
Taken together, Roper and Graham form the "foundational
principle" for the Miller Court's conclusion that age matters in the
context of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement.52
Miller insists that it is constitutionally impermissible to remove
factors of youth from the proportionality balance by mandatorily
subjecting juveniles to the same LWOP sentence as adults." The
Miller Court reiterated the lessons of Roper and Graham, mandating
that the "imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children."5
The line of cases culminating in Woodson v. North Carolina"

dictates that the Eighth Amendment requires an individualized
consideration of the "character and record" of each convicted
defendant before the death penalty may be imposed.5 6 In Woodson,
as in Miller, state law provided for the mandatory imposition of a
particular sentence upon conviction of first-degree murder." The
47. Id. at 2034.
48. Id. at 2027.
49. See id. at 2029 ("A life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile
offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity. Incapacitation cannot override all
other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment's rule against disproportionate
sentences be a nullity.").
50. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
51. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 ("Roper established that because juveniles have
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.").
52. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012).
53. See id. at 2468.
54. Id. at 2466.
55. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
56. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 309-10 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (noting that the vesting of standardless
sentencing power in the jury violated the Eighth Amendment); Winston v. United States,
172 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1899) (holding that the discretionary power of a jury to choose not
to impose the death penalty may not be hindered).
57. In Woodson, the mandatory sentence was death, and in Miller, the mandatory
sentence was LWOP. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286-87; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
Compare Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, sec. 1, § 14-17, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323, 323
(passed in 1974 Second Session) ("A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
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Woodson plurality noted that a sentencing law that "treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass" violates
the "fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment."" Particularly troubling to the Woodson plurality was
that the mandatory sentencing law precluded the judiciary from
checking for any potentially arbitrary exercise of the state's harshest
punishment." The plurality emphasized that because of the severity
of the proposed punishment (in Woodson's case, death), there is an
increased "need for reliability in the determination that" the imposed
punishment is appropriate, all factors considered.6
Miller's reliance on the Woodson line begins with the proposition
originally set forth in Graham: LWOP and death sentences have
certain similarities that allow for the categorical bar of LWOP in
certain, distinct circumstances. 6 1 In Graham, juvenile LWOP
sentences were treated as analogous to capital punishment for nonhomicide crimes because "the sentence alters the offender's life by a
forfeiture that is irrevocable."62 The Miller Court cited Woodson and
extended the death sentence analogy, dictating that when LWOP
sentences are on the table, just as in capital punishment cases, the
sentencing authority must not " 'exclude[ ] from consideration ... the

possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors.' "63 Thus, the Miller
Court held that "a sentencer [must] have the ability to consider the
'mitigating qualities of youth' " present in juvenile LWOP cases.'
C.

The Emergence of the Miller Hearing

After Miller, it is clear that criminal sentencing structures that
mandatorily
impose LWOP for juvenile offenders are
unconstitutional.65 However, unlike Graham and Roper, where
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall
be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death."), with ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-2(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) ("[T]he punishment for murder ... is death
or life imprisonment without parole.").
58. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
59. See id. at 303.
60. Id. at 305.
61. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466-67.
62. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
63. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (second alteration in original) (quoting Woodson, 428
U.S. at 304).
64. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
65. See id. at 2475.
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particular sentences were categorically disallowed for juveniles, the
Miller Court specified that juvenile LWOP sentences are still
permissible as long as "mitigating qualities of youth" are analyzed
and accounted for by the sentencing authority.6 6 The Miller Court
dictated that, in cases where juvenile LWOP is a possibility, the
sentencing authority must "take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison."" In order for the "mitigating
factors of youth" to be properly addressed, the Court emphasized five
factors that the sentencing authority should take into account: (1) the
ability of the juvenile defendant to "appreciate the risks and
consequences of his actions"; (2) the juvenile defendant's family and
home environment; (3) the circumstances of the offense, "including
the extent of [the juvenile defendant's] participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him"; (4)
any potential "incompetencies associated with youth" (i.e. inability to
deal with police officers or to assist in his own defense); and (5) "the
possibility of rehabilitation."6 8
Practically speaking, the aforementioned "mitigating qualities of
youth" would presumably be considered during a sentencing hearing,
after which the sentencing authority would choose whether to impose
LWOP, or a lesser sentence, based on the factors presented. This new
juvenile sentencing scheme seems straightforward. However, the
Court confused this seemingly simple process by stating a somewhat
haphazard, but meaningful, caveat to the general rule that juvenile
LWOP is still constitutionally permissible. Justice Kagan, writing for
the majority, stated "[b]ut given all we have said in Roper, Graham,
and this decision about children's diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to [the] harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon."69 Thus, the Miller Court insisted that the decision
"do[es] not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make [the juvenile
LWOP] judgment in homicide cases," but specified that such
judgments should be "uncommon."o On their own, the Miller factors

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2467.
Id. at 2469.
Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2469 (emphasis added).
Id.
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are relatively straightforward, but when the "uncommonality"
element enters the mix, the result is less clear."
Lower courts' interpretations of the force behind Miller's
"uncommonality" specification will have important implications for
the future sentencing of juveniles and for retroactivity. For example,
in Jackson's case, he did not fire the fatal shot,72 and his behavior was
likely influenced at least in part by the group-think mentality of the
other boys involved in the robbery. Additionally, Jackson had a
violent family background"-both Jackson's mother and his
grandmother had previously shot other individuals.7 4 Similarly, in
Miller's case, he was high on drugs and alcohol he had consumed with
the adult victim-his mother's drug dealer." Moreover, Miller's
stepfather physically abused him, his alcohol and drug-addicted
mother neglected him, and he spent much of his childhood in and out
of foster homes.7 6 Furthermore, Miller was undoubtedly a disturbed
individual at the time of his offense; he had previously attempted
suicide four times, the first of which when he was only six years old.7
Thus, on remand, should the resentencing authority treat
Jackson as a "common" juvenile offender, ineligible for LWOP
because of his life-long immersion in violence? On the other hand,
was Miller's crime so abhorrent that, despite his horrendous family
life, he should be one of the "uncommon" cases where juvenile
LWOP is appropriate? These questions must be answered by the
states, which are now saddled with the heavy burden, post-Miller, of
doling out juvenile LWOP sentences at a vaguely defined,
constitutionally appropriate rate: sometimes, but not too often.
71. While opponents of the Miller decision argue that the Court's "uncommonality"
mandate is merely dicta, such a conclusion flies in the face of the fundamental premise of
the Court's decision. The Court insists that children are psychologically and sociologically
less culpable for criminal acts; therefore, that children should be held to the same exact
standard for criminal culpability as adults should be an uncommon occurrence. See
Summary, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 286
(2012) ("At heart, an implementation of procedural safeguards true to Miller's underlying
premises amounts to something close to a de facto substantive holding: children should be
sorted from adults and, except when indistinguishable from adults, be spared LWOP.
Considering the underlying psychological premise, Justice Kagan's suggestion that
'appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon' sounds less like dicta." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469)).
72. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
73. See id. at 2468.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 2469.
76. See id.
77. Id.
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D. A Challenge to the States: Addressing Retroactivity
The challenge for the states is to determine not only how to
sentence future juvenile offenders appropriately after Miller, but also
what must be done with the nearly 2,500 prisoners, as of 2008, already
serving life sentences for crimes committed as a juvenile before the
Court's decision in Miller." This Comment argues that although the
Miller Court is unclear on the overarching effects of its holding and
fails to give the states much direction on how to apply its decision,
states should look to the spirit of Miller and apply its holding
retroactively. It is clear that in future cases, sentencing authorities
must consider the Miller factors on an individualized basis in every
case where juvenile LWOP is on the table before a sentence of
LWOP may be imposed. Therefore, the sentencing laws of twenty-six
states (including North Carolina) and the federal government must be
changed. 9 But in the course of changing their sentencing laws, the
challenge to the states will be whether or not to write these new laws
in a manner that allows for already convicted juveniles to relitigate
their LWOP sentences.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST RETROACTIVITY

Parts II and III detail two arguments for retroactivity. First, as a
matter of constitutional law, courts should apply Miller retroactively
because it reflects a substantive change in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Second, as a policy matter, state legislatures should
enact laws which allow for Miller to be applied retroactively, because
such an application is most true to the changing cultural and societal
values noted by the Miller majority."o
The ConstitutionalTest for Retroactivity
This Part discusses the Supreme Court precedent for determining
whether new rules should be applied retroactively and argues that

A.

78. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 3.
79. See Brief for Respondent (reprint) at 17-18, Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455 (No. 109646) (listing the twenty-seven jurisdictions in which LWOP is mandated for fourteenyear-old aggravated murderers transferred from the juvenile system: United States federal
system, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming).
80. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 ("[W]e view [the] concept [of Eighth Amendment
proportionality] less through a historical prism than according to 'the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976))).
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because the Court's holding in Miller constitutes a substantive rule, it
should apply retroactively. As previously noted, the Supreme Court
did not mention the issue of retroactivity in its decision in Miller."'
Therefore, lower courts must look to other precedent to determine
whether the Miller rule should apply retroactively. Generally, a new
rule articulated by the Supreme Court is applied retroactively if the
rule is either substantive in nature (as opposed to procedural),8 2 or if
it falls within a narrow retroactivity exception set forth by the
Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane" and its progeny.
In Teague, the Supreme Court recognized as a general rule that
defendants' cases on collateral review should not be afforded the
benefit of having new rules apply retroactively to already final
convictions.' However, the Teague Court articulated a three-step test
for determining which exceptional new rules may be applied
retroactively. First, the reviewing court "must determine when the
defendant's conviction became final."85 "Second, it must ascertain the
'legal landscape as it then existed'. . . . That is, it must decide whether
the rule [to be applied retroactively] is actually 'new.' "86 Finally, if
the rule is new, the court must decide whether the new rule falls into
one of two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity.
It is exceedingly difficult to meet all of the aforementioned criteria
and overcome the presumption of nonretroactivity; however, this Part
argues that the Miller case was sufficiently groundbreaking in the
context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to justify an exception
to the general rule of nonretroactivity.

81. It is fairly typical in Supreme Court jurisprudence for the Court to remain silent
on the particular issue of retroactivity. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989)
(plurality opinion) ("In the past, the Court has, without discussion, often applied a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure to the defendant in the case announcing the new
rule, and has confronted the question of retroactivity later when a different defendant
sought the benefit of that rule.").
82. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004) ("New substantive rules
generally apply retroactively.... New rules of procedure, on the other hand, generally do
not apply retroactively.").
83. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
84. See id. at 310 ("Unless [cases on collateral review] fall within an exception to the
general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.").
85. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 (2004).
86. Id. (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 468 (1993)).
87. Id.; see infra Part II.A.3.
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1. Establish the Date of Final Decision
The issue of Miller's retroactivity will only be salient to
defendants whose convictions were final prior to June 25, 2012, the
date of the Miller decision, because Miller will automatically apply to
those defendants whose convictions were pending on direct review
when Miller was decided." "[C]onvictions are final 'for the purposes
of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the
state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally
denied.' "" Thus, any defendant previously sentenced to mandatory
juvenile LWOP who wishes to bring his case to be resentenced on
collateral review must first establish that his conviction was final prior
to June 25, 2012.
2. Determine Whether the Rule Is New
After establishing the date upon which a defendant seeking a
retroactive application of the Miller decision was finally convicted,
the reviewing court will analyze whether the rule set forth in Miller
was a "new" rule in comparison to the legal landscape at the time of
the defendant's final conviction. According to Teague, "a case
announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government."" Stated
differently, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final."" The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Miller was a
new rule for the purpose of retroactivity because it altered the
existing juvenile sentencing laws of many jurisdictions throughout the
country. For example, the laws set by the legislatures of Alabama and
Arkansas previously dictated that, if convicted of first-degree murder,
juvenile defendants received mandatory sentences of LWOP.' The
Supreme Court explicitly overruled this mandatory sentencing
scheme-instead setting forth a new rule, that juvenile defendants
may not be sentenced to mandatory LWOP, regardless of the nature
of the offense.9 3 Furthermore, the Miller decision places a new
88. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) ("[A] new rule for the conduct
of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending
on direct review or not yet final . . . .").
89. Beard, 542 U.S. at 411 (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).
90. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. See discussion supra Part I.A.
93. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
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obligation on twenty-six states and the federal government, namely,
that juvenile defendants must be given the opportunity to present to
the sentencing authority mitigating factors of youth before they may
be sentenced to LWOP. 94 Therefore, the Miller Court's prohibition of
mandatory juvenile LWOP, and the requirement of a special
sentencing hearing, amounts to a new rule for the purposes of further
retroactivity analysis.
3. Assess Whether an Exception Applies
The final retroactivity consideration is whether the new Miller
rule falls within either of the two exceptions to nonretroactivity. A
new rule will be applied retroactively only if it is either substantive in
nature or if it is a " 'watershed rule[] of criminal procedure
implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.' "9
a.

The ProceduralVersus Substantive Debate

In Schriro v. Summerlin,6 the Court stated

that "[n]ew

substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions
that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as
well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or
persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish."97
The debate as to whether the Miller rule is procedural or substantive
for purposes of retroactivity is undoubtedly a close one. Opponents of
retroactivity argue that the Miller rule is procedural because it simply
requires an additional sentencing procedure for juvenile offenders,
namely, a Miller-style hearing." Were the Miller Court to create a
categorical bar on LWOP sentences for all juvenile offenders (as the
Court did in Roper and Graham),99 the corresponding rule would be
definitively substantive and apply retroactively, because LWOP

94. See id.
95. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484, 495 (1990)).
96. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
97. Id. at 352 (citation omitted).
98. See, e.g., Geter v. State, No. 3D12-1736, 2012 WL 4448860, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 27, 2012) ("[Tlhe procedural determination in Miller ... merely requires
consideration of mitigating factors of youth in the sentencing process.").
99. Recall that Roper categorically barred the death penalty for all juvenile offenders,
and Graham prohibited LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide crimes. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).

2194

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

would be "a punishment that the law cannot impose upon [juvenile
defendants]." 100

After Miller, courts can still impose juvenile LWOP sentences;
however, a close analysis of the case law suggests the conclusion that
the Miller rule is still substantive because it categorically bars
mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders. The Supreme Court's
discussion in Schriro exemplified the substantive versus procedural
tension arising in the context of the Miller case. The Court dictated
that a rule is substantive if it " 'prohibit[s] the imposition of ...
punishment on a particular class of persons[.]' In contrast, rules that
regulate only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability
are procedural."' 0 In fact, Miller does both. Miller categorically
prohibits mandatory LWOP punishments for a particular class of
persons-juvenile offenders-and regulates the manner of
determining whether a young defendant is sufficiently culpable to be
one of the uncommon juvenile offenders deserving of LWOP.
While it is true that Miller requires a particular "procedural"
type of sentencing hearing, the case actually does much more than
that-Miller crosses the threshold into a substantive rule. The Court
made two particular holdings that render the rule substantive in
nature. First, the Court stated that the instances of juveniles serving
LWOP sentences should be "uncommon.""o Such a prediction by the
Court is not procedural; it is substantive. It articulates a value
judgment, rather than a procedural requirement, and effectively
makes LWOP "a punishment that the law cannot [or, according to the
Court, should not] impose" upon most juveniles."o' Second, in addition
to the uncommonality value judgment, the Miller Court categorically
bars the imposition of mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders. Such
a categorical bar puts Miller in the same substantive arena as Roper
and Graham, holding that the state cannot constitutionally impose a
certain punishment on certain classes of people (in these cases,
juveniles). It is a substantive change in the law because it "puts

100. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
101. Id. at 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495
(1990)); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) ("[T]he first exception set
forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal
punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense."), abrogated by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
102. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
103. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
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matters outside the scope of the government's power." 1" Miller does
not simply require that the sentencing authority look at a juvenile
defendant's age-related characteristics before imposing a sentence.
This would be a procedural rule. Rather, Miller speculates that only
in the uncommon case should a juvenile be sentenced to LWOP
despite full disclosure of his mitigating factors of youth. Practically,
the only way to ensure that this new, substantive rule is followed is for
the states to reopen old cases and examine them with the
proportionality lessons of Miller in mind.
b. Miller Is a Watershed Rule of CriminalProcedure
Even if the Miller rule is found to be procedural, rather than
substantive, it should still be applied retroactively because it
constitutes a "watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure,"'o which is the
other exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity. In Teague, the
plurality formally adopted the "watershed rule" exception as it was
previously articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Mackey v. United States.o6 In describing the possibility of such a
watershed rule arising in the future, Justice Harlan imagined that one
day, "growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what
[society] can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, [might]
properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction."107
The Court has consistently likened this exception to the right to
counsel at trial, which is now considered " 'a necessary condition
precedent to any conviction for a serious crime.' "Io Over time, the
Court has articulated various formulations of the "watershed rule"
0 Most often, the Court describes the exception as
exception.o'
pertaining only to the "small core of rules requiring observance of
those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered
104. Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look
at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com
/news/article/chemerinsky-juvenile-lifewithoutparolecase manscourtsmustlook-at-se
n/.
105. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating it was
desirable to blend the Mackey requirement with a principle from another case).
106. 401 U.S. 667 (1971); see Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 (discussing the Harlan
concurrence from Mackey).
107. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
108. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694); see also Jessica
Smith, Retroactivity of Judge-Made Rules, ADMIN. OF JUST. BULL. (N.C. Sch. of Gov't),
Dec. 2004, at 7 n.80.
109. See Smith, supra note 108, at 6-7 (noting the formulations of the "watershed rule"
exception in Schriro and Beard).
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liberty.""'0 Additionally, "[t]hat a new procedural rule is
'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be
one 'without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished.' ""I Therefore, while the Court freely
recognizes the "watershed rule" exception, it has set a very high
standard for the existence of such an exception.' 12
Just as Justice Harlan predicted, though, there came a time in the
mid-summer of 2012, when the "growth in social capacity .. . alter[ed]
our understanding""' of the culpability of juvenile offenders in the
criminal justice system.'14 In Miller, five Supreme Court Justices
acknowledged that, despite the violent nature of Miller's crime, he is
fundamentally less blameworthy than he would have been in four
years' time.115 The majority recognized that to impose a sentence
upon Miller which does not take into account his diminished
culpability would violate the bedrock Eighth Amendment principle of
proportionality.1 16 Miller dictates that juveniles are inherently less
culpable because of their age, and therefore, additional safeguards
are needed to protect their interests and prevent the type of
disproportionate sentencing prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
The notion of proportionality-the punishment must fit the crime-is
at the heart of our criminal justice system and " 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.' ""I1
Miller effectively held that to sentence
a juvenile offender to die in prison without taking into account his
mitigating factors of youth would circumvent a bedrock principle of

110. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting O'Dell v.
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997)).
111. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
112. In fact, the Court has not yet recognized any rule as falling into the "watershed"
exception articulated in Teague. See Beard, 542 U.S. at 417 ("[W]e have yet to find a new
rule that falls under the second Teague exception."). However, lower courts (including the
Supreme Court of North Carolina) have recognized certain "watershed" exceptions under
Teague. See, e.g., State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 513-14, 444 S.E.2d 443, 446-47 (1994)
(allowing retroactive application of the McKoy rule which invalidated the unanimity
requirement of North Carolina's capital sentencing scheme).
113. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971).
114. See supra text accompanying note 69.
115. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
116. Id. at 2466.
117. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693); see
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (noting that the Eighth Amendment's guarantee that individuals
not be subjected to excessive punishments " 'flows from the basic precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned' to both the offender and the
offense" (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))).
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our criminal justice system," 8 and it therefore constitutes a watershed
change in our understanding of criminal procedure.
Furthermore, the rule set forth in Miller is not simply
fundamental in an abstract sense. Rather, it is a rule without which
the fairness of juvenile sentencing would be seriously diminished.
Specifically, the Miller Court held that it is unconstitutional to impose
a sentence of LWOP on a juvenile defendant without considering
whether his age-related characteristics might have diminished his
culpability.1 19 Juveniles who are currently serving mandatory LWOP
sentences were never given an opportunity to present mitigating
factors of youth, and if Miller is not applied retroactively, they never
will. Therefore, these pre-Miller mandatory LWOP sentences are
unconstitutional and will remain so without a renewed application of
Miller to already-final mandatory LWOP sentences.
III. REACTIONS TO MILLER: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

As the confusion spurred by the Miller decision has trickled
down to the states, the legislative and legal reactions have varied
drastically. Some states, like North Carolina, reacted quickly to Miller
and reworked their criminal sentencing laws, eliminating mandatory
LWOP sentences for juveniles as well as filling in some of the holes
left by the Miller decision.'20 Other states have left the application of
Miller and the question of its retroactivity for the courts to sort out. 12 1
The differing legislative and legal reactions to the Miller decision
generally fall into one of two categories: the reactions either reflect a
willingness to embrace the basic principle of Miller-namely, that
children are fundamentally less culpable than adults for even the most
abhorrent crimes-or they exploit the Supreme Court's vagueness
and circumvent the demands of Miller.12 2
In the same vein, states also differ on the issue of the
retroactivity of Miller. This Part argues that those states with
mandatory juvenile LWOP sentencing structures should amend their
118. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (" 'An offender's age,' we made clear in Graham, 'is
relevant to the Eighth Amendment,' and so 'criminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.' " (quoting Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010))).
119. See id. at 2469.
120. See infra Part III.C.
121. See infra Part III.B.
122. See Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming
Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 39 (2012) ("At least in
some jurisdictions, a possible development from Graham and Miller is to retard, rather
than spur, the movement toward a justice system more sympathetic to juveniles.").
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laws to allow for Miller-style sentencing hearings for future juvenile
defendants as well as those previously sentenced to mandatory
LWOP. Such a retroactive application of Miller is consistent with the
Constitution 23 and reflects sound public policy.
A.

The Legislative Reaction

1. Post-MillerLegislation in the State with the Most Juvenile Lifers:
Pennsylvania
Not long after the Miller decision came down, the Pennsylvania
legislature passed a bill that explicitly disallows resentencing hearings
for juveniles already serving mandatory LWOP.124 The implications of
this legislation are huge because Pennsylvania currently has 444
prisoners serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as
juveniles-the most of any state in the country.'25
For currently pending and future juvenile sentencing hearings,
the Pennsylvania bill allows the sentencing authority to choose to
impose either juvenile LWOP or a term of years imprisonment, with a
minimum term of thirty-five years for defendants aged between
fifteen and eighteen who are convicted of first-degree murder.12 6
Therefore, while juvenile LWOP is no longer mandatory upon
conviction of first-degree murder in Pennsylvania, the sentencing
authority is free to impose a large term of years sentence (say, ninetynine years) until parole eligibility-the functional equivalent of a life
sentence. In such a circumstance, the juvenile has been sentenced to
die in prison before he could possibly become parole-eligible, but he
has not been deemed by the sentencing authority to fall into one of
the "uncommon" cases where juvenile LWOP is appropriate under
Miller. In fact, under the Pennsylvania law, if the sentencing authority
decides to impose a term of years sentence, there is no requirement
for a Miller-style hearing whatsoever, as the requirement for
particular findings only applies "[i]n determining whether to impose a
123. See supra Part II.
124. See Act of Oct. 25, 2012, Pub. L. No. 1655-204, sec. 2, § 1102.1(a), 2012 Pa. Laws
(2012) (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1(a) (West Supp. 2013)) ("A
-,
person who has been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree ... and
who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
sentenced as follows ..... (emphasis added)).
125. See Michelle Leighton & Brian Foley, State-by-State Legal Resource Guide, U.S.F.
SCH. OF L., http://www.usfca.edullaw/jlwop/resource-guide/ (last updated November 28,
2012).
126. See Act of Oct. 25, 2012, sec. 2, § 1102.1(a)(1) (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1102.1(a)).
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sentence of life without parole."127 Crafty Pennsylvania judges, then,
are fully authorized under the new law to impose summarily a term of
years sentence without hearing evidence or making findings of any
age-related characteristic of the defendant, thus circumventing the
Supreme Court's most fundamental demand in Miller.128
The Pennsylvania bill lists specific age-related factors to be taken
into consideration during a Miller-style sentencing hearing only if the
sentencing authority is considering imposing a sentence of juvenile
LWOP.129 Interestingly, though, the bill requires the court to
simultaneously make aggravating findings of victim and community
impact, including the potential "threat to the safety of the public or
any individual posed by the defendant['s]" eventual release from
prison.130 Such aggravating factors are not discussed in Miller, which
requires only that the lower courts consider mitigating factors of
youth.'
The enacted Pennsylvania legislation certainly eliminates
mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences-a clear demand of Miller-but
the practical results of the legislation are a far cry from the goals set
forth in Miller. Not only will nearly twenty percent of the total
number of convicted juveniles serving LWOP sentences remain
imprisoned in Pennsylvania without rehearing,132 but future juveniles
could be given effective life sentences without the opportunity for a
Miller-style hearing. Therefore, while the new Pennsylvania
legislation conforms the state sentencing rules to be technically in
compliance with Miller (by eliminating mandatory LWOP sentences
for juveniles), the legislation actually circumvents Miller and reflects
the harsh juvenile sentencing culture in Pennsylvania which is sure to
remain post-Miller. Now, the 444 juvenile LWOP prisoners in
Pennsylvania will remain behind bars for life, completely unaffected
by the Supreme Court's decision in Miller.

127. See id.
128. In comparison, North Carolina's legislation mandates a Miller-style hearing in all
cases. See Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 148, sec. 1, § 15A-1477(a)(2), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 713,
713 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1477(a)(2), recodified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 15A-1340.19B(a)(2) (Supp. 2012)) ("The hearing ... shall be conducted by the
trial judge as soon as practicable after the guilty verdict is returned.").
129. See Act of Oct. 25, 2012, sec. 2, § 1102.1(d)(7) (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1102.1(d)(7)) (listing Miller's typical age-related factors including "age," "mental
capacity," "maturity," "[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited," and possibility
of rehabilitation).
130. Id.
131. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
132. See Leighton & Foley, supra note 125.
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The Legal Reaction

1. Florida and Michigan Courts Refuse to Allow for Retroactive
Miller Hearings

Intermediate courts of appeals in Florida and Michigan have
held that Miller should not be applied retroactively."' If these
decisions are upheld by higher courts, the 612 prisoners already
sentenced for crimes committed as juveniles in Florida and Michigan
will die in prison,'34 without an opportunity to be heard on how their
particular age-related characteristics "counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.""' Such a result flies in the
face of the Court's admonition in Miller that juvenile LWOP be
uncommon, as the 612 prisoners in those two states alone account for
almost one quarter of the currently imprisoned juvenile lifers in the

country.13 6
In Geter v. State,' 7 a panel of the Florida District Court of
Appeals rejected Drewery Geter's contention that he should be
resentenced in accordance with Miller; his mandatory LWOP
conviction became final on May 12, 2010, after numerous appeals.'
On the night before Geter's seventeenth birthday, he murdered his
neighbor with a disturbing amount of violence and rage.' 39 Similarly,
in People v. Carp,40 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
Raymond Carp was not entitled to a retroactive application of Miller;
his sentence became final on November 20, 2006, when he was
mandatorily sentenced to life without parole under Michigan law.141
Unlike Geter's case, though, Carp's crime was laden with
indications of youth-related mitigating characteristics. Carp was
fifteen years old when he acted as an accomplice to a murder that was
primarily perpetrated by his twenty-two-year-old half-brother.'42
After numerous police interviews wherein Carp told many different
stories about the night of the crime, Carp eventually admitted to
133. See Geter v. State, No. 3D12-1736, 2012 WL 4448860, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 2012); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
134. See Leighton & Foley, supra note 125 (stating that 266 juveniles in Florida and 346
in Michigan are serving LWOP sentences).
135. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
136. See Leighton & Foley, supra note 125 (adding the totals from every state shows
that there are currently 2,571 juveniles serving LWOP sentences as of this writing).
137. No. 3D12-1736, 2012 WL 4448860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012).
138. Id. at *1.
139. See id.
140. 828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
141. See id. at 691, 723.
142. See id. at 690.
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"throw[ing] a mug at the victim," without "knowing whether it made
contact because his eyes were closed ...

,

clos[ing] the blinds and

windows," and handing his half-brother a knife upon his halfbrother's request. 14 3 Carp's half-brother proceeded to stab the victim
twenty-three times.1"
Both the Florida and Michigan courts of appeals gave similar
reasoning for their decisions not to apply Miller retroactively. Both
courts explored the constitutional issue of retroactivity,145 and
subsequently found that the rule in Miller was procedural and not a
"watershed ruling." 146 The Florida and Michigan courts both
highlighted two principal concerns about retroactivity: the
expenditure of state resources and concerns about the finality of
criminal cases. 147 Both courts asserted that limited state resources
would make a retroactive application of Miller impracticable and
uneconomical, as the state would have to foot the bill for the costs of
new sentencing hearings.14 8 Further, the courts argued that there is a
legitimate interest in maintaining the finality of criminal cases, for
victims of crimes and the public in general, which outweighs any
benefits of resentencing. 14
While both of these concerns are understandable and relevant,
they do not outweigh the state's post-Miller obligation to address the
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders and ensure that criminal
sentences adhere to the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
requirement.
It is true that states will have to take on the costs of additional
resentencing hearings if Miller is applied retroactively. However, in

143. Id. at 691.
144. See id. at 690-91.
145. See id. at 704-08; Geter, 2012 WL 4448860, at *3-9.
146. Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 723; Geter, 2012 WL 4448860, at *8 (replacing Teague's
"watershed" language with similar language of "development[s] of fundamental
significance").
147. Carp,828 N.W.2d at 714-15; Geter, 2012 WL 4448860, at *4.
148. See Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 714-15; Geter, 2012 WL 4448860, at *8 ("[R]etroactive
application would destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and
therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and
intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
149. See Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 714; Geter, 2012 WL 4448860, at *8 ("[A]pplying Miller
retroactively would undermine the perceived and actual finality of criminal judgments and
would consume immense judicial resources without any corresponding benefit to the
accuracy or reliability of the [underlying criminal case]." (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the context of criminal sentencing, there are additional important
costs to consider other than monetary costs:
Although finality of criminal sentences may provide some
benefits for society, finality certainly imposes costs. There are
the obvious costs: first, to the prisoner who is serving more time
than he or she should under the relevant sentencing laws, and
second, to the state for the fiscal cost of continuing to
incarcerate the prisoner. But broader questions about the
legitimacy of the system are also raised when the system does
not correct clear injustices that are easy to fix ... Failing to fix
these injustices undermines public confidence in the justice
system, fosters a sense that the system is unfair, and can
ultimately diminish the deterrent effect of the criminal law. 5 o
The liberty costs of keeping a prisoner behind bars for life for a
crime for which he has an inherently diminished level of culpability
are immeasurable, not to mention unconstitutional under the
proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment."'
Furthermore, confining juveniles to life in prison precludes
society from gaining any benefits from rehabilitated juvenile
offenders. The Miller Court highlighted this potential for
rehabilitation and societal contribution, indicating that "[1]ife without
parole 'forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal[ ]' [and] ...
reflects 'an irrevocable judgment about [an offender's] value and
place in society,' at odds with a child's capacity for change."' 5 2 Miller,
Graham, and Roper together represent a fundamental belief of the
Supreme Court that juvenile offenders are inherently capable of
rehabilitation. Such potential for rehabilitation is completely
disregarded by the Florida and Michigan courts in favor of the more
abstract notion that finality in criminal cases is beneficial to society.
Miller demands recognizing that certain factors can drive
children to commit crimes that they would not have committed had
they been older. Concerns of state resources and sentencing finality
are legitimate, but they are far outweighed by concerns of the
fundamental fairness of the criminal justice system. After Miller, it is
simply unfair to keep a juvenile imprisoned for life without taking
into account his diminished culpability. Consider the case of

150. Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 87-88 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
151. See supra, Part I.B.
152. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (second alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
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Raymond Carp."' Certainly his victim's family rests easier knowing
that the two perpetrators are behind bars for life. However, the
sentencing authority in Carp's case never considered if, as an adult,
Carp would have acted differently. Would Carp have succumbed to
the pressures of his older brother to hand him a knife if he had been
three years older? Miller demands an answer to this question, but if
Carp is upheld in Michigan, it will never be answered-in fact, the
question will never even be posed.
2. Illinois Courts Hold That Miller Should Be Applied to Previously
Sentenced Juvenile Defendants
Florida and Michigan are not the only state courts that have
ruled on the retroactivity of the Miller holding. Two separate panels
of the Illinois Appellate Court have held that Miller is retroactive,
thus requiring the state of Illinois to take on 103 resentencing
hearings in accordance with Miller.15 4 In both cases, the courts cited
the Geter and Carp decisions, yet refused to follow their lead.
The first case, People v. Morfin,ss executed a Teague analysis

and concluded that because "Miller mandates a sentencing range
broader than that provided by statute for minors convicted of first
degree murder," the Miller rule is substantive and therefore should be
applied retroactively.156 Similarly, in the second case, People v.
Williams,'57 the court held that Miller "made a substantial change in
the law in holding under the Eighth Amendment that the government
cannot constitutionally apply a mandatory sentence of life without
parole for homicides committed by juveniles.""' Furthermore,
Williams explicitly recognized Miller as a "watershed rule of criminal
procedure."' 5 9 Therefore, under a Teague analysis, both Morfin and
Williams requireMiller to be applied retroactively in Illinois.
Interestingly, the Williams court addressed the cost and finality
concerns raised in Geter and Carp, and dismissed them summarily. 16o
The court acknowledged that its holding will mandate over 100
resentencing hearings, but stated "[t]his is not such a great number of
cases for us to conclude that it is an unreasonable burden for the
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685.
Leighton & Foley, supra note 125.
981 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 1022.
982 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 197-98.
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State and the courts to reopen their cases for resentencing."1 61
Furthermore, the court recognized the concerns of the families of
victims in having to endure an additional court proceeding.162
However, the court found that complying with Miller outweighs such
concerns, explaining that a new sentencing hearing requires "only one
further proceeding" and "[the victims' families] will have another
opportunity to make a statement as to the impact the crime has had
upon them before a new sentence is given."16 3 Overall, the court in
Williams seems to take a hard and fast approach to retroactivity, flatly
requiring resentencing hearings because the previous sentencing
authority did not take age-related mitigating factors into account at
the time of sentencing.16" State courts in Illinois, therefore, have
directly taken on the cost-benefit analysis of allowing for resentencing
hearings under Miller and unwaveringly determined that the
proportionality concerns of the Eighth Amendment outweigh the
"costs" incurred by the state in resentencing.
3. Other Reactions to the Miller Decision: Iowa's Governor Pushes
Back
Instead of allowing the legislature to enact new laws in
compliance with Miller, or permitting the courts to interpret the
constitutionality of the Iowa state sentencing laws, Iowa Governor
Terry Branstad decided to take Miller retroactivity matters into his
own hands. On July 16, 2012, three weeks after the Miller decision
was announced, Governor Branstad commuted the sentences of all
thirty-eight previously sentenced juveniles serving LWOP in Iowa."'s
The catch, though, is that those juvenile LWOP sentences were
reduced to life with the possibility of parole, but only after sixty years
imprisonment.'" Therefore, a seventeen-year-old who was previously
sentenced to juvenile LWOP in Iowa will not be eligible for parole
until he is seventy-seven years old and will not be given an
opportunity for resentencing. In a press release explaining his
decision, the Governor stated that "[j]ustice is a balance and these
161. Id. at 198.
162. Id. at 198-99.
163. Id. at 199.
164. Id. at 198 ("[T]he sentencing court did not graduate and proportion punishment
for [the] defendant's crime considering his status as a juvenile at the time of the offense.
This violates the eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.").
165. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Iowa Terry Branstad, Branstad Moves to
Prevent the Release of Dangerous Murderers in Light of Recent U.S. Supreme Court
Decision (July 16, 2012).
166. Id.
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commutations ensure that justice is balanced with punishment for
those vicious crimes.""' The press release further purports that the
commutation "gives the opportunity for parole in compliance with
the recent Supreme Court decision [in Miller].""
Despite the governor's claim that his decision serves "justice," it
represents a complete perversion of the rule of Miller and an injustice
to the thirty-eight juveniles serving LWOP in Iowa.
Allowing convicted first-degree murderers the opportunity to
seek parole is undoubtedly a bitter pill to swallow for all states.
Resentencing hearings certainly come with costs, both monetary and
emotional. Critics of Miller's retroactivity claim that new Miller
hearings for already convicted defendants would be heartbreaking for
victims' families and burdensome on the finality concerns of the
justice system.16 9 As discussed previously, these propositions are
surely accurate. 70 But, as a Connecticut appellate judge bluntly
pointed out, while retroactivity comes with heavy burdens to both the
state and to victims, after Miller, "that is how it should be."' 7 ' Miller
demands that the justice system takes a second look at closed cases
through a new lens of diminished juvenile culpability. By its holding
in Miller, the Supreme Court has forced the nation to reevaluate its
perception of juveniles in the justice system, and reexamine the
culpability of juveniles who commit even the most horrible crimes.
This landmark in the evolution of our juvenile justice system should
not be confined by arbitrary lines of conviction dates.
C.

North CarolinaLegislatesfor Retroactivity

Less than three weeks after the Miller decision, North Carolina's
General Assembly approved a bill aptly titled "An Act to Amend the
State Sentencing Laws to Comply with the Supreme Court Decision
in Miller v. Alabama" (the "Act").172 Governor Perdue signed the bill
into law on July 12, 2012.1'7 Prior to this Act, North Carolina was one
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Brief for National Organization of Victims of Juvenile Lifers as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22-23, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos.
10-9646, 10-9647).
170. See supraPart III.B.1.
171. State v. Riley, No. 33506, 2013 Conn. App. LEXIS 9, at *65 (Conn. App. Ct. Jan.
1, 2013) (Borden, J., dissenting).
172. See Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 148, sec. 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 713, 713-14 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1476 to 1479, recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
H 15A-1340.19A to 19D (Supp. 2012)).
173. Id.
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of the twenty-six states that imposed mandatory LWOP sentences on
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in adult court.'7 4 The Act
eliminates mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders and replaces it
with a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility
of parole. This "life imprisonment" with the possibility of parole
sentence is mandatory for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder
under a felony-murder theory, and optional for juveniles convicted of
first-degree murder under any other theory."' The Act defines "life
imprisonment" as a minimum of twenty-five years prior to becoming
eligible for parole."' The Act further articulates that a Miller-style
hearing shall be held prior to sentencing for any juvenile convicted of
first-degree murder and lists a number of potentially mitigating
circumstances which the defense may submit to the court, mirroring
many of the age-related factors set forth in the Miller decision."'
Finally, the Act treats Miller as applying retroactively, and
explicitly allows for resentencing hearings for juvenile defendants
who have already been sentenced to mandatory LWOP.78 The
language of the Act leaves no doubt that the legislature intended that
each already-convicted juvenile defendant be allowed to have a
resentencing hearing wherein the Miller factors of youth could be
considered, and his or her sentence potentially reduced to life with
the possibility of parole.'

174. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
175. See Act of July 12, 2012, sec. 1, § 15A-1477(a), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 713
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1477(a), recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1340.19B(a)).
176. See id. at § 15A-1476, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 713 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1476, recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19A).
177. See id. at § 15A-1477(c), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 713 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1477(c), recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19B(c)) ("The
defendant or the defendant's counsel may submit mitigating circumstances to the court,
including, but not limited to the following factors: (1) Age at the time of the offense. (2)
Immaturity. (3) Ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct. (4)
Intellectual capacity. (5) Prior record. (6) Mental health. (7) Familial or peer pressure
exerted upon the defendant. (8) Likelihood that the defendant would benefit from
rehabilitation in confinement. (9) Any other mitigating factor or circumstance.").
178. See id. at § 15A-1478(d), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 714 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1478(d), recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19C(d)) ("All
motions for appropriate relief filed in superior court seeking resentencing under the
provisions of this Article shall, when filed, be referred to the senior resident superior court
judge, who shall assign the motion as provided by this section for review and
administrative action .... ") (emphasis added).
179. See id. at § 15A-1476 to 1479, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 713-14 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1476 to 1479, recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.19A to 19D).
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As compared to the reactions of the other mandatory LWOP
jurisdictions, the bill passed by the North Carolina legislature is truly
groundbreaking.so Practically, as will be discussed in Part IV, the
result of the Act will be resentencing hearings for the approximately
forty-four North Carolina prisoners serving mandatory LWOP
sentences for crimes committed before their eighteenth birthdays.'"'
However, the North Carolina Act is most consistent with the
foundational principle of Miller. The Supreme Court demands that
children must be treated differently from adults when facing the
state's harshest punishments, and the sentencing authority must take
into account "how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison."' At the time of their
sentencing, the forty-four juvenile LWOP prisoners in North Carolina
were treated exactly the same as their adult first-degree murder
counterparts, and their mandatory life sentences allowed for
absolutely no mitigating factors to be considered. Now, in North
Carolina, all forty-four of those prisoners will have the opportunity to
have their sentences reduced to life with the possibility of parole if
the mitigating factors of their youth are found to be compelling by the
sentencing authority.
IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF RETROACTIVITY: A NORTH
CAROLINA STUDY
In the weeks following the Miller decision, the North Carolina
legislature enacted arguably the most comprehensive sentencing
reforms of all the mandatory LWOP states in reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller.'8 However, as discussed previously, many
other states are not following its lead." This Part analyzes the
practical effects of retroactivity in North Carolina and demonstrates
that North Carolina's allowance of Miller retroactivity is most
consistent with the newly established requirements of the Eighth

180. This is especially true given the fact that North Carolina is not one of the most
juvenile-friendly states in the nation. For a thorough analysis of North Carolina's
reluctance to reform its unique juvenile justice system, see generally Tamar R. Birckhead,
North Carolina,Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1443, 1445 (2008) ("North Carolina is the only state in the United States that treats all
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults when they are charged with criminal offenses
and then denies them the ability to appeal for return to the juvenile system.").
181. See Leighton & Foley, supranote 125.
182. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (emphasis added).
183. See Act of July 12, 2012, sec. 1.
184. See supraPart III.
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Amendment in terms of both criminal procedural process and
constitutional sentencing results.
Currently, there are approximately forty-four prisoners in North
Carolina serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed before their
eighteenth birthdays.18 1 Under North Carolina's new law, each
prisoner whose sentence was mandatory will be entitled to be heard
on a motion for appropriate relief to have the Miller factors applied
and considered during a new sentencing hearing, wherein the
presiding judge must keep in mind the defendant's mitigating agerelated characteristics.' This Part analyzes four cases of North
Carolina juveniles sentenced to mandatory LWOP prior to the Miller
decision. The facts of the four cases represent a broad spectrum of the
presence of age-related characteristics in the commission of the crime.
This Part discusses the likelihood of reduced sentences in each case
and thus illustrates the practical effects of retroactivity in a state
where Miller-style resentencing hearings will inevitably occur.
A.

North Carolina'sJuvenile LWOP JurisprudencePre-Miller

Before Miller, two cases were controlling in North Carolina on
the issue of the constitutionality of the imposition of mandatory
juvenile LWOP: State v. Lee" and State v. Stinnett.'" In both cases,
teenagers were convicted of first-degree murder, sentenced to
mandatory LWOP, and had their sentences upheld by the court of
appeals despite claims that such a mandatory sentencing scheme
violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 18 9
In Lee, a fourteen-year-old defendant and his friend murdered a
mentally disabled man whom they had met at a party that night.190
Evidence at trial showed that the victim's apartment was "ransacked"
as well.19' Lee was convicted of "first-degree murder based on [both]
premeditation and deliberation and felony murder," two alternative
theories of first-degree murder under North Carolina law. 1m On
appeal, the Lee court stated that the mandatory life sentence "is

185. Leighton & Foley, supra note 125.
186. See Act of July 12, 2012, sec. 1.
187. 148 N.C. App. 518, 558 S.E.2d 883 (2002).
188. 129 N.C. App. 192, 497 S.E.2d 696 (1998).
189. See Lee, 148 N.C. App. at 525, 558 S.E.2d at 888; Stinnett, 129 N.C. App. at 200,
497 S.E.2d at 701.
190. See Lee, 148 N.C. App. at 519-20, 558 S.E.2d at 885.
191. Id. at 520, 558 S.E.2d at 885.
192. Id.
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severe but it is not cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense."19 3
Similarly, in Stinnett, the evidence at trial tended to show that after
his mother sent him away to live with his absentee father, fifteenyear-old Stinnett shot his father to death.194 The jury convicted
Stinnett of first-degree murder.' 95 On appeal, Stinnett argued that the
North Carolina mandatory life imprisonment law, coupled with a law
mandating transfer of juveniles charged with first-degree murder to
adult court, violated the Eighth Amendment. 9 6 In fact, Stinnett
specifically argued that "construing [the two statutes] together ...
does not allow the judge or fact finder an opportunity to consider
defendant's age or rehabilitative potential."197 However, the court of
appeals rejected this contention, insisting that "when a punishment
does not exceed the limits fixed by statute, the punishment cannot be
classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense." 98
The Miller decision, coupled with the new North Carolina
juvenile sentencing law, has rendered this line of juvenile LWOP
cases invalid. Mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are now
unconstitutional, and in North Carolina, any defendant previously
sentenced to mandatory LWOP will be entitled to a resentencing
hearing.199 However, it remains to be seen how liberally North
Carolina courts will apply Miller and whether the resentencing
hearings will actually amount to reduced sentences for already
convicted juveniles serving LWOP.
B.

Felony-Murder Cases

Under the new North Carolina law, if the juvenile defendant was
convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of the felony
murder rule, his sentence shall be reduced to life imprisonment with
parole.2" The law further defines "life imprisonment with parole" as
"a minimum of 25 years imprisonment." 201 This approach is most
193. Id. at 525, 558 S.E.2d at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v.
Green, 348 N.C. 588, 612, 502 S.E.2d 819, 834 (1998).
194. See Stinett, 129 N.C. App. at 193-95, 497 S.E.2d at 697-98.
195. See id. at 195-96, 497 S.E.2d at 699.
196. See id. at 199, 497 S.E.2d at 701.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 200, 497 S.E.2d at 701.
199. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(2) (Supp. 2012).
200. See id. § 15A-1340.19B. This provision of the North Carolina law is consistent with
the concurring opinion in Miller, written by Justice Breyer, which points out that the type
of "transferred intent" which is present in felony murder cases "is not sufficient to satisfy
the intent to murder that could subject a juvenile to a sentence of life without parole."
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19A.
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consistent with the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement
and the Miller holding. A defendant can be convicted of murder
under a felony-murder theory without having any intent to kill, as
opposed to the alternative first-degree murder conviction that
requires premeditation and deliberation.202 Furthermore, based on
the sociological and psychological differences between juveniles and
adults highlighted in Miller, juveniles are more susceptible to be
pressured into situations that ultimately culminate in a felony-murder
conviction.2 03
The case of Matthew Lawrence Taylor is an informative example
of the effect of the new North Carolina law on convicted juvenile
felony-murderers. Taylor was sixteen years old when he participated
in a murder in Durham in 2004.20 He was convicted of first-degree
murder in Durham County Superior Court in July of 2005, under a
felony-murder theory for the underlying felony of robbery. 205 As in
Jackson's case, the evidence presented at trial showed that the
gunshots to the victim's head were not delivered by Taylor, but rather
by one of the older men with whom Taylor associated.2 06 The
evidence showed that Taylor was present for the murder and helped
his friends dispose of the victim's body, but both Taylor and another
witness indicated that Taylor's twenty-one-year-old friend actually
shot the victim. 207 Based on his conviction of first-degree murder,
Taylor was sentenced to mandatory LWOP in accordance with the
prior North Carolina sentencing laws. 0 On appeal, Taylor argued
that his LWOP sentence for a crime committed at age sixteen
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, but the court of appeals
dismissed this argument summarily.209

202. The intent element for felony murder relates to the intent to commit the
underlying felony. See id. § 14-17.
203. See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 89, 133 (2009) (arguing that juvenile defendants should
be subject to a different mental state requirement in criminal proceedings because "minors
are unable (or less able) to form 'specific intent,' [and] do not consider future
consequences in the manner contemplated by the felony murder doctrine").
204. See State v. Taylor, 178 N.C. App. 395, 415, 632 S.E.2d 218, 231 (2006).
205. See id. at 399, 632 S.E.2d at 222.
206. See id. ("Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under the Felony
Murder Rule rather than on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation.").
207. See id. at 407, 632 S.E.2d at 226-27.
208. See id. at 399-400,632 S.E.2d at 222.
209. See id. at 416, 632 S.E.2d at 232 ("Defendant has failed to show his life in prison
without parole sentence rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.").
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Now, the new law will automatically reduce Taylor's LWOP
sentence and he will be eligible for parole at the age of forty-one.210
The facts of Taylor's case and the circumstances surrounding his
offense seem to be laden with Miller factors, underscoring the
appropriateness of the reduced sentence. First, Taylor had a relatively
minor role in the homicide, and was likely influenced by the pressure
of his older peers to participate in the crime.2 1' Second, as compared
to the other juvenile defendants, Taylor has a higher potential for
rehabilitation. Taylor had no prior record at the time of the murder,2 12
and would be far-removed from the negative influences of his peers
after serving twenty-five years in prison.
Given the Supreme Court's admonition in Miller, Taylor, and all
juveniles previously convicted of first-degree murder solely under a
felony-murder theory, should not be considered one of those
"uncommon" juveniles deserving of a sentence of LWOP. A
retroactive application of Miller is required to rectify
unconstitutional, disproportionate sentences such as the one imposed
on Matthew Taylor.
C.

Premeditationand DeliberationCases
Unlike Taylor's case, the following three cases represent
instances in which the defendants, despite their youth, were convicted
of premeditated and deliberate first-degree murder. Upon
resentencing, North Carolina courts will likely view these cases in a
different light than the felony-murder defendants, and be more
hesitant to resentence based on the jury's finding of an intent to kill.
According to the new law, courts must hear and consider mitigating
factors of youth for each previously sentenced defendant, but the
court will not be required to reduce any defendant's sentence if he
was convicted based on premeditation and deliberation.213 Such
discretion in resentencing is consistent with the holding in Miller, as
each defendant's youth will be considered in the context of his crime,
210. Since Taylor was sixteen at the time of his crime, and the North Carolina law
allows for parole eligibility after twenty-five years imprisonment for those defendants
sentenced solely under felony-murder theory, Taylor will be eligible for parole at age
forty-one. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19A (Supp. 2012).
211. Taylor was the youngest member of the trio involved in the murder. Brief for
Appellant at 43, State v. Taylor, 178 N.C. App. 395, 632 S.E.2d 218 (2006) (No. COAO51580).
212. See id. at 41.
213. See Act of July 12, 2012, ch. 148, sec. 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 713, 713-14 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1476 to 1479, recodified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§H 15A-1340.19A to 19D (Supp. 2012)).
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and he will be sentenced according to his level of culpability in light
of his individual mitigating factors.214
1. Harry James
Harry James was sixteen years old when he committed murder.215
He was later convicted in Mecklenburg County of first-degree
premeditated murder under an acting-in-concert theory, as well as
felony-murder. 216 He was sentenced to mandatory LWOP in June
2010.217 On the night of the murder, James accompanied his twentyone-year-old friend to the home of James's church-sponsored mentor,
where they intended to commit a robbery.2 18 James's friend, Morene,
told James that all he needed to do was convince the victim to open
the door, and he would do the rest.219 The robbery escalated to
murder, and the evidence at trial showed that James assisted his older
friend by searching the house for valuables, writing down the victim's
ATM pin number, retrieving pillows that Morene ultimately used to
smother the victim, and driving the getaway car.220 James also
suggested to Morene at least once that they should leave the house
and not continue with the murder.22 1
The facts of James's case indicate the presence of many potential
Miller mitigating factors of youth. James arguably had a low extent of
participation in the murder, or at least in the planning of such,222 and
will likely present evidence that he experienced a high degree of peer
pressure from his older friend Morene.223 In fact, James testified that
214. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
215. State v. James, No. COA11-244, 2011 WL 4917045, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 18,
2011).
216. See id. at *3. In North Carolina, under the acting-in-concert theory:
[I]f two persons join ... to commit a crime, each of them ... is not only guilty as a
principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any
other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose.
State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 231, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (1997) (first alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Erlewine, 328 N.C. 626, 637, 403 S.E.2d 280, 285 (1991)). Therefore, the
court of appeals found that James "did not need the specific intent to kill Jenkins." James,
2011 WL 4917045, at *5.
217. See James, 2011 WL 4917045, at *3.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at *1-2.
221. See id. at *1.
222. The evidence showed that James was not the killer; nevertheless, the court found
that James' specific intent to kill was not required based on the acting in concert theory.
See id. at *5.
223. See id. at *1.
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Morene threatened to hurt his family if he refused to help with the
robbery.224 Additionally, the possibility of rehabilitation, which the
Miller Court so strongly emphasized, is a cogent factor for James, as
he had no prior arrests or convictions at the time of the murder. 225 If
the resentencing authority in James's case properly accounts for the
Miller mitigating factors of youth, it is likely the authority will reduce
James's sentence to a possibility of parole after a term of years. The
facts of the James case highlight the types of crimes for which Miller
sought to reduce mandatory life sentences-those characterized by
peer pressure, bad decision-making, and particularly for James, an
"[in]ability to extricate [himself] from horrific, crime-producing
settings. "226
2. Jhalmar Medina
Jhalmar Medina was sixteen years old when he shot one of his
friends eight times. 227 He was convicted of premeditated first-degree
murder in 2004, and sentenced to mandatory LWOP. 228 The evidence
presented at trial showed that Medina was angry with the victim
because the victim had not returned some of Medina's belongings
which he stored at the victim's house.229 Medina hid in the woods,
waiting for the victim to walk past, as he did nightly, and ambushed

the victim. 23 0
Although there was no testimony at trial as to Medina's family
life and upbringing, his actions surrounding the murder indicate a
lessened presence of Miller mitigating qualities of youth, and a
heightened degree of culpability for the crime. Unlike in James's and
Taylor's cases, Medina was the killer, and the mastermind of the
murder. 231 Additionally, Medina's potential for rehabilitation is
lessened, as evidence at trial indicated that Medina had been in and
out of prison prior to the murder.232 Medina also failed to return from
a lunch break during his murder trial, and asked his girlfriend to run

224.
225.
244).
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id.
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 18, James, 2011 WL 4917045 (No. COAllMiller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
See State v. Medina, 174 N.C. App. 723, 725, 727, 622 S.E.2d 176,177, 179 (2005).
See id. at 724, 727, 622 S.E.2d at 177-78.
See id. at 726-27, 622 S.E.2d at 178.
See id. at 725, 622 S.E.2d at 177.
See id.
See id. at 732, 622 S.E.2d at 181.
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away with him, 233 demonstrating a lack of willingness to participate in
the rehabilitative process and a general continued disregard for the
law. He was apprehended the next day. 234 Based on the lessened
presence of mitigating factors of youth for Medina, it is more likely
that the resentencing authority will uphold his LWOP sentence.
However, such a sentence would still be consistent with Miller. The
Miller Court was careful to allow juvenile LWOP under certain, albeit
uncommon, circumstances. 235 Given the nature of Medina's crime and
his malicious actions following the crime, his could be an uncommon
case where juvenile LWOP is appropriate.
3. Laurence Lovette
In 2008, the University of North Carolina Student Body
President, Eve Carson, was brutally murdered.23 6 One of her
convicted murderers, Laurence Lovette, was seventeen years old at
the time of the murder. 237 The evidence at trial showed that Lovette
and his older friend, twenty-one-year-old Demario Atwater,
kidnapped Carson, drove her to multiple ATMs to withdraw cash,
then shot her multiple times. 238 Lovette delivered five shots to
Carson's body, which were not immediately fatal, then Atwater
delivered the fatal shot to Carson's head. 239 Lovette was convicted of
the first-degree murder of Carson in December, 2011,240 and was
sentenced to mandatory LWOP. 24 1 Subsequently, Lovette was granted
a new sentencing hearing by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
accordance with Miller and the new North Carolina juvenile
sentencing law.242

233. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 11, Medina, 174 N.C. App. 723, 622 S.E.2d
176 (No. COA 05-216).
234. See id.
235. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
236. See State v. Lovette, -

N.C. App. _, _, 737 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2013).

237. See id. at , 737 S.E.2d at 441.
238. See Brief for the State at 13-14, Lovette, _, N.C. App. _, 737 S.E.2d 442 (No.
COA 12-794).
239. See id. at 14.
240. See Lovette,

-

N.C. App at

-,

737 S.E.2d at 434.

241. See id. at _, 737 S.E.2d at 436.
242. See id. at -, 737 S.E.2d at 441-42 ("Here, as conceded by the State, the Act
applies to Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of Eve Carson's murder .
... Accordingly, we must vacate Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole
and remand to the trial court for resentencing as provided in the Act."); see also Chelsey
Delaney, Carson'sKiller to Get New Sentence, DAILY TAR HEEL (Chapel Hill, NC), Feb.

6, 2013, at 1 (discussing the implications of the Miller decision on Lovette's conviction as a
minor).
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Lovette's resentencing hearing was held in June of 2013, and
heard by the same judge who sentenced him to LWOP just eighteen
months prior.2 43 During the hearing, Lovette presented one witnessa psychologist-in an attempt to prove that he should be granted the
opportunity for eventual parole. 2 " The psychologist testified that he
had originally found Lovette to be cold. 245 He believed Lovette may
not be so "irretrievably corrupted" as to preclude rehabilitation in
prison.246 At the same time, however, the psychologist conceded there
was also a possibility that Lovette would not improve while in
prison.247
Lovette was unable to take advantage of many of the Miller
mitigating factors during his resentencing hearing. First, the evidence
at trial showed that he had a high extent of participation in the
kidnapping and murder of Carson. Lovette drove Carson's car to the
ATM while she was held hostage in the back seat and later shot her
five times. 248 Lovette also participated in covering up the crime after
the fact.249 Second, Lovette presented a weak case of potential for
rehabilitation. He had an extensive criminal history prior to Carson's
murder, and even has another pending, unrelated murder charge.250
Additionally, Lovette displayed absolutely no remorse at his
resentencing hearing, stating that "[n]obody's perfect" and "I'm not
the monster y'all made me out to be."251
The prosecutor in Lovette's case successfully argued that, despite
his age at the time of the murder, Lovette's crime was deserving of
the punishment of life without parole. Quoting language directly from
Miller, the prosecutor insisted "Laurence Lovette is the uncommon
case. He's a predator. He was a predator on March 5, 2008 (when
Carson was killed). He's a predator today. He will be a predator until
243. See Anne Blythe, Judge Again Sentences Laurence Lovette to Life Without Parole
for Murdering Eve Carson, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), June 3, 2013,
http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/06/03/2936604/jude-again-sentences-laurence.html.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Brief for the State at 13-14, Lovette, -, N.C. App. -, 737 S.E.2d 442 (No.
COA12-794).
249. See id. at 12 (explaining that the defendant broke the handgun he used on Carson
into many pieces, and disposed of the pieces in various locations throughout Durham,
North Carolina).
250. Lovette was on probation at the time of Carson's murder, and has been indicted
for the robbery and murder of another college-aged student. See Joseph Neff, Court
System Failed to Curb Lovette, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 4,2008, at Al.
251. See Blythe, supra note 243.
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the end of his life."252 In his discretion, the judge upheld Lovette's
LWOP sentence.25 3
The discretion to make the choice that the judge in Lovette's
case made-to uphold a juvenile LWOP sentence-is exactly what
the Miller Court intended. Lovette's mitigating factors of youth were
considered, yet found to be outweighed by the nature of the crime
and his involvement in the crime. This balancing act is the essence of
the Miller decision, and goes to the heart of the Eighth Amendment's
proportionality demand. Thus, the North Carolina legislature has
created the framework for cases to be reevaluated in accordance with
Miller, and the outcome of the Lovette case demonstrates that the
process is working.
D.

Retroactivity in North Carolina

North Carolina's retroactive application of Miller is most
consistent with the constitutional demands of the Supreme Court.
The aforementioned potential changes in each defendant's sentence
reflect the defendant's degree of culpability, in light of his age-related
characteristics. Without a retroactive application of Miller in North
Carolina, juvenile defendants like Matthew Taylor would continue to
serve the same life-long sentence as adults, without ever having the
opportunity to present mitigating factors of youth. North Carolina's
retroactivity approach should act as a model for other states in their
attempts to comply with the demands of Miller.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court left many questions unanswered in
Miller, it clearly answered one question that is undoubtedly on the
minds of the 2,500 juveniles currently serving LWOP in the United
States. To those minors who were previously sentenced to die in
prison, the Court said loudly and clearly-age matters. Age did
matter at the time of the offense, and it does matter now, as the lower
courts set out to decide each defendant's level of culpability in
accordance with the Eighth Amendment. Although Miller left the
retroactivity issue unresolved, there are both constitutional and policy
reasons for applying the decision retroactively. North Carolina should
be a model for other states, as its courts dutifully abide by Miller
under the new North Carolina law, and reopen closed cases in an

252. Id.

253. Id.
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attempt to balance old crimes with new, constitutionally appropriate
punishments.
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